Episode 13: Anti-Hopping Laws: Freedom to Disassociate?

In the December edition of the Law Series, the Consti Team writes on anti-hopping laws. In discussing its constitutionality, this article touches on the ambit of freedom of association under Article 10 of the Federal Constitution, while contrasting such interpretations to its adoption in several other countries.

1.0. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Definition of Party-Hopping

Party hopping describes the lawmakers' act of switching political parties after having a guaranteed seat in the Legislature. Other terms include floor crossing, carpet crossing, or even waka jumping.[1] ‘Political frogging’ has been popularly used as well, as their ‘hop’ from one party to another is said to be akin to nature’s frogs.

1.2. Introduction of Anti-Hopping Law in Malaysia

The fall of the Pakatan Harapan (‘PH’) government has seen talks of a federal anti-hopping law coming about. That said, this is not the first time such a law has been whispered around. In 1978, former opposition leader Lim Kit Siang once tried to introduce an anti-defection Private Member’s Bill in hopes of ensuring political integrity and preventing corruption. Unfortunately, it was shut down by the government before anything substantial could materialise.[2] In more recent times, there has been urges by the Malaysian Bar President Salim Bashir towards the Perikatan Nasional (‘PN’) government to enact the legislation.[3]

1.3. Obstacles the Law Aims to Conquer

The biggest obstruction it aims to overcome, arguably, is political instability. The ruling government changes as it loses majority support in Parliament from the ‘hops’ of its members to another political party, giving majority to the latter.[4] For instance, the infamous Sheraton Move in February 2020 caused the change of our Federal Government. A political coup occurred, where parties and politicians left coalitions and parties respectively, to join the newly established PN.[5] The change of these political allegiances also saw a change of four State Governments.[6]

This abrupt shift of political compasses creates voter injustice as constituents do not receive the representation they voted for. The Prime Minister (‘PM’) is elected through an electoral college system where Members of Parliament (‘MP’) vote to decide who should lead the Executive with convention dictating it be their party’s Chairman.[7] Consequently, citizens usually vote, not for the respective MP, but for their choice of PM and the political party from which he comes. If party hopping occurs on a large scale, the current government — mandated by the citizens — may be overthrown as it may lose influence over the legislative. This was illustrated in the recent by-election in Melaka triggered by party hopping. Political analyst Prof Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani said, inter alia, those who crossed floors eventually lost as voters held loyalty to their respective parties, and not individual candidates. Personality pull was non-existent.[8]

An anti-hopping law would prevent any instance of such momentous changes in the Parliament as a ‘backdoor government’ cannot be formed by the politicians who defect. As their seats would now become vacant post-defection, there is an incentive for MPs to remain in their respective partiers no matter the tide. Arguably, any chance of the Parliament losing majority influence due to frogging would be prevented ­— securing political stability and preventing voter injustice.

Parliament would also be further strengthened as larger parties are stopped from luring in smaller parties, i.e. independent MPs, in exchange for either secured positions in the party and the Cabinet, or financial rewards.[9] Theoretically, it forces candidates to stand by their political side after being sworn in, be it as a partyless legislator, out of fear of being legally sanctioned. The decisions made thereafter will be for the constituency, not under a collective roof, forced upon them.

Observations from an economic perspective see a reinforcement of the previous positive impression on our foreign investment. A United Nations (‘UN’) report mentioned Malaysia’s foreign direct investment plunged by 68% in 2020, with a myriad of industry leaders pinning it on political turbulence. The Centre for Governance and Political Studies (‘Cent-GPS’) mooted the that the overall loss of high skill jobs was caused by this jumble of political affairs as well.[10] United Malays National Organisation (‘UMNO’) vice president Dato’ Seri Mahdzir Khalid also confessed the act of party switching might create a negative perspective on investors and businesses.[11] Ergo, with a more stable government, rotating only in general elections (‘GE’), gives a sense of political and economic safety to our foreign investors, solidifying said investment into Malaysia.

2.0. AMBIT OF ARTICLE 10

2.1. Article 10(1) on Freedom of Association

According to Art 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution, all citizens have the right to form associations. However, this right is not absolute and is subject to Clauses (2), (3) and (4).

2.2. Restrictions in Clause (2)

As previously mentioned, the right of citizens to form associations is not absolute. Under Art 10(2), Parliament is given the power to impose restrictions on the freedoms and rights provided under Art 10(1) by way of law.

Art 10(2)(c) provides that Parliament may impose restrictions on a citizen’s right to form associations as it deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, as well as in the interest of public order or morality.[12]

The Federal Court in Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor provides no definitive meaning to the phrase ‘public order or morality’, but finds the clause must be read as ‘such reasonable restrictions’.[13] Doing so, the court found matters of discipline of the legal profession and its regulation as being part of public morality as it is in the public interest that advocates and solicitors who serve on the Malaysian Bar behave professionally, act honestly and are independent from political influence. Hence, Section 46(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 restricting MPs from being a part of the Malaysian Bar fell within the scope of Clause (2).[14]

2.3. Nordin Salleh on Article 10 and Anti-Hopping Laws

In the famed case of Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin Bin Salleh & Anor (‘Nordin Salleh’)[15], the respondents were elected and sworn in as members of the Kelantan State Assembly after winning seats in the GE as representatives of the political party Semangat 46. However, they then left said political party and joined UMNO instead. The Kelantan state legislature then passed an amendment to their constitution, the Laws of the Constitution of Kelantan (First Part) (Amendment) Enactment 1991, which stated that:

‘Art XXXIA(1): If any member of the Legislative Assembly resigns, is expelled from, ceases to be a member of such political party, he shall cease to be a member of the Legislative and his seat shall become vacant.

Art XXXIA(2): For the purpose of Clause (1) the Legislative Assembly has the power to determine the vacancy of such a seat and this determination is final and shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground whatsoever.’

The State Legislature passed a resolution stating the respondents had ceased to be members of the Assembly, declaring their seats as vacant for their respective constituencies. Following that, the respondents contested for their seats again in the by-elections as candidates of Barisan Nasional but lost.

Thus, the issue before the court was whether Art XXXIA of the Kelantan State Constitution, was inconsistent with Art 10(1)(c) which provides for the right to freedom of association, and hence void. The High Court had previously answered in the affirmative.

The Supreme Court, in agreeing so, held the right to associate also includes the freedom to disassociate. Inter alia, the Court also held:

1. It is a fundamental right, therefore there are special manners to suspend or abridge it. The yardstick to apply was what is the direct and inevitable consequence or effect of the impugned state action on the fundamental right? The direct and inevitable effect or consequence was to make the exercise of the fundamental right of association of the respondents 'ineffective and illusory'.

2. Only Parliament may by law impose such restrictions, as it deems necessary or expedient in the most exceptional circumstances and that too in the interest of the security of the Federation or any part thereof, public order or morality, and on no other grounds.[16]

2.4. Legal Experts’ Opinions

It is unquestionable that this 1992 landmark case had restricted the possibility of an anti-defection law to be legislated. From this, legal experts are divided into two factions when viewing whether Nordin Salleh prohibits any such form of law.

2.4.1. Anti-Hopping Law Can Be Enacted

The first faction is of the opinion that the Supreme Court decision merely shut the door of anti-defection laws but did not seal it. According to Leonard Yeoh and Nurul Qarirah from Tay & Partners, it can still be argued that Art 10(2) of the Federal Constitution allows Parliament to enact laws to restrict the freedom of association.[17] Similarly, GK Ganesan also stated that in the Supreme Court’s decision, it did not state that Parliament cannot enact laws to punish party hoppers as the State of Kelantan was enforcing a state law.[18]

The Malaysia Bar Council was of a similar stance. The Malaysian Bar argued party hopping to be politically immoral as it betrays the people’s trust, and therefore necessary, and within the jurisdiction of the Parliament to restrict the freedom of association, as well as dissociation of party hoppers for the interest of public order or morality.[19]

2.4.2. Anti-Hopping Law Cannot Be Enacted

On the other hand, other legal experts opine the Supreme Court had clearly found that freedom to dissociate is an integral part of freedom to associate, and any law which infringes this fundamental liberty is void ab initio.

Professor Philip Koh Tong Ngee and Datuk Bastian Pius Vendargon argue the need for the Federal Constitution to be amended and prior to that, no law can be enacted to punish defectors.[20] Political Scientist Wong Chin Huat also stated that Art 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution had to be amended to explicitly state that party hopping will cause a politician to be disqualified as a member of Parliament or State Legislative Assembly.[21]

However, Datuk Seri Gopal Sri Ram has a different perspective. In his opinion, even with the needed constitutional amendments, it will be futile as it touches on an integral part of the constitution, which is the freedom of association.[22]

2.5. Relevancy of Nordin Salleh

From the frequent changes of government, most citizens are fed up with this political norm of disloyalty and power grabbing. This raises the question of the relevancy of Nordin Salleh.

Supporters of an anti-hopping law voiced the urgent need of ensuring political and economic stability in Malaysia justifies the enactment of the law. They further argued that it has been almost three decades since the case of Nordin Salleh, and the new Malaysia should have a different perspective on freedom of association.[23] Perhaps the preconditions of security, public order and morality enshrined in Art 10(2)(c) can include ensuring political and economic stability, as after all, the highest Court of the land has declared the need for ‘reasonableness’ when deciding.[24]

In addition, according to Dharma Suria Risman Saleh v Menteri dalam Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors, the Federal Court held if an act disrupts or has the potential to disrupt safety and tranquility, it is then prejudicial to public order. [25] Applying it to current times, party hopping which leads to the collapse of the government, followed by political crisis and economic downturn can severely disrupt the tranquillity of our beloved nation. In this scenario, an anti-hopping law would be constitutional as it abides Art 10(2).

Nordin Salleh also mentions that the State Constitution Amendment done by Kelantan as something only Parliament can enact. In this, it not only is constitutional, but also has the support of the Supreme Court.[26]

However, as seen in Nordin Salleh, the primary issue to be considered by the judicial arm is if the law directly and inevitably infringes the fundamental right of association enshrined in the Federal Constitution, causing it to be null under Art 4(1).[27] Ultimately, said law would infringe the fundamental rights, as the main objective of the law is to punish party hoppers, and punishment itself is a form of restriction. Being a Supreme Court judgement, it certainly holds a strong weight in the legal realm.

3.0. INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE ON ANTI-HOPPING LAW

3.1. International Declarations, Treaties or Conventions

Art 20 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) guarantees freedom of association and provides that no one may be compelled to belong to an association, which also guarantees the freedom to disassociate.[28] UDHR was adopted by the United Nation General Assembly on the 10th December 1948, proclaiming it as a common standard of achievement among member states.[29] The rights guaranteed under UDHR are divided into different treaties that could be enforced against member states through ratification.

Despite joining the United Nations on the 17th of September 1957, Malaysia has not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which enforces the right to freedom of association. [30]

Nevertheless, Malaysia has stated said freedom of association is safeguarded under Art 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution,[31] when responding to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner’s questionnaire.[32] As provided above, there are limitations in play: in the interest of national security; public order; and morality.[33] A similar provision is also stipulated in Art 29(2) of the UDHR, in which the freedom could be restricted by laws for the purpose of securing the rights and freedoms of others and meeting the just requirement of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.[34]

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), co-founded by Malaysia together with four other Southeast Asian nations on August 8, 1967,[35] had adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in which its Art 10 states that ASEAN members are to affirm all the civil and political rights in the UDHR.[36] Accordingly, Malaysia is in support of such a declaration.

3.2. Commonwealth Counterparts

Floor crossing is not unique to Malaysia as other democratic counterparts of ours also face this political threat. For instance, the United Kingdom’s House of Commons experienced eight party hops in the 1990’s. Canadian MP Belinda Stronach switched allegiance from the Conservative Party to the Liberal Party in 2005 to enable a survival of a vote of no confidence.[37]

Below are a few examples of commonwealth nations who have gone through the heaps of challenges in legislating an effective deterrent to political switching.

3.2.1. Singapore

Singapore has its right to freedom of association entrenched in Art 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore[38] which is in pari materia to our Art 10.[39] Be that as it may, Singapore distinguishes themselves by enshrining their anti-hopping law in their Constitution.[40] It stipulates that the seat of a member of Parliament shall become vacant if the member is expelled or resigns from the political party for which he stood in the election. Such law was introduced in 1963 after the occurrence of two incidents of defection.

The first defection took place after the 1959 GE when the Minister for National Development and his two supporters were expelled from the then ruling party, the People’s Action Party, for an alleged smearing campaign against the government. All three Parliamentarians formed a new opposing party, the United People’s Party. The second defection occurred in 1961 after a Confidence Motion was brought before the legislative assembly. Even though the government won the motion, 13 dissidents defected to form another opposing party, the Barisan Sosialis.[41]

At that point of time, there was no anti-hopping law to curb the situation and those defectors could still sit in the legislative assembly. Ergo, to prevent a recurrence, then PM, Lee Kuan Yew swiftly introduced an anti-party hopping provision into the state's constitution, regaining two-third majority in the legislative assembly in 1963.[42] More recently, a MP for the constituency of Hougang, Yaw Shin Leong, resigned from his party due to alleged marital affairs.[43] The then Speaker of Parliament announced the vacancy in accordance with Art 46(2)(b).[44]

3.2.2. India

India’s anti-defection law was enacted because of numerous party-hopping incidents that happened in the 1970’s.[45] Item 2(a)-(b) of the Tenth Schedule states that a person is disqualified from being a Member of Parliament:

‘(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or

(b) if he votes or abstains from voting in such House contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in either case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of such voting or abstention.’[46]

Item 6 of the Tenth Schedule specifies that the Speaker will carry out the final deliberation through parliamentary proceedings to settle questions of whether a MP or a legislative member has been disqualified on the ground of defection.[47] Since its enactment, the effect of this legislation carries significant weightage on determining the validity of MPs and legislative members depending on specific facts and circumstances.

In Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v Hon’ble Speaker, Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Ors,[48] the issues were whether the Speaker of the Kartanaka Legislative was authorised under the Constitution to reject the resignation tendered by a member of the legislature, and if he can disqualify members for the rest of the term. The court held the Speaker acted against his constitutional duty because he may only examine whether the resignation was tendered voluntarily. He could not disqualify any member of the legislative assembly.

3.2.3. New Zealand

Our Kiwi counterparts took a couple of approaches to tackle floor crossing. The first being introducing anti-hopping provisions in the Electoral (Integrity) Amendment 2001 in which a seat will become vacant when lawmakers defect.[49]

The second, which is a more radical approach compared to other countries, was the complete restructuring of their voting system. The well-known ‘first-past-the-post’ system was dropped in exchange for the Mixed-Member Proportional Representation (‘MMP’) system. In this system, each voter casts two votes: a ‘party vote’ for their preferred political party and an ‘electorate vote’ for their preferred candidate in the voter’s local constituency. The sixty-nine electorate seats allocated in Parliament are apportioned amongst political parties who have garnered enough votes, appointing based on a list of ranked candidates from the abovementioned party.[50]

From this, the perceived advantage of the MMP system is that it creates an equal representation of political parties in Parliament that reflects overall voter preferences. Secondly, it would be able to reduce the political monopoly of MPs of a single party, which then forms a check and balance framework for the government.

However, the MMP system in New Zealand may not be an optimal solution in solving the defection conundrum. Awatere Huata v Prebble illustrates such a loophole in the MMP system as the Supreme Court had to decide whether defection would alter the proportionality of party representation in Parliament.[51]

In this case, the plaintiff MP came under investigation for alleged misappropriation of funds. Consequently, her party refused her subscription for membership under the ACT party. The Speaker was informed by the party that the MP’s membership of the party had ceased and that they would send a notice for her parliamentary seat to be declared vacant. The party alleged that the plaintiff’s actions had distorted the proportionality of the House as it weakened the party’s advocacy strength. An injunction restraining the leader of the party from delivering the notice was sought by the plaintiff.[52]

Alas, the case was ruled in the plaintiff’s favour as it was held that even though defection may affect advocacy strength, there is no direct correlation to advocacy strength and the distortion in proportionality. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that it was the party’s actions which caused the disproportionality, not the plaintiff.[53]

3.3. Reluctance of Countries in Enacting Anti-Hopping Laws

In enacting anti-hopping laws, countries have either opted for the route of legislation or amendments to their respective constitutions. Yet, many ultimately decide against enacting such policies altogether. This can be tied to the ‘free representational mandate’ theory; voters grant power to the elected representative believing these officials have the attributes to make the best decision possible. According to this theory, it is entirely up to the representatives to decide as to remain in the party they are in or switch parties to their own whims and fancies.

4.0. POSSIBLE SETBACKS TO FACE

4.1. Disallows MPs to remove themselves from parties once elected

A valid criticism against anti-hopping laws – and why freedom of association is brought to the fray – is because MPs will not be able to remove themselves from the parties that they have joined. This argument does not merely stop at “it is the right of the MP to disassociate” as there are practical concerns borne by MPs and Malaysia’s political system.

Essentially, political parties should reflect a politician’s values, beliefs and principles. In an ideal world, politicians should also resemble their respective constituencies’ aspirations and needs. In finding a balance between this, MPs may face some political dissonance when dealing with their parties, in which Edmund Burke succinctly mentions in his speech to his electors in Bristol: ‘Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion’.[54] Once they learn the true underlying principles of a party after being in office, or even after a party chooses to switch stances in a political crisis, values may no longer align with the parliamentarian. It may be argued that politicians should be allowed to follow their personal values dynamically, regardless of whether the act of crossing floors was for personal or public interest.

For instance, Hannibal Hamlin’s circumstance was a famous defection that made headlines. Albeit being a staunch Democrat, as well as Abraham Lincoln’s first Vice President, he did not agree with the pro-slavery position taken by the other members within the Democratic Party. As a result, he defected to the Republicans, and was hailed as a man with principles.[55]

Closer to home, we have Tun Dr Mahathir and the creation of Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu). After facing several rejections within UMNO to withhold Datuk Seri Najib’s presidential position after the 1Malaysia Development Berhad scandal, he left UMNO and created his own party Bersatu, consisting of those who left and even was expelled by UMNO, to topple Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s government.[56] Albeit not being a matter of direct party hopping between dominant parties, this ordeal shows that even seasoned parliamentarians would have it in their interest to quit their current political parties once their ideals do not align.

4.2. Party leaders would maintain an iron grip over other lawmakers

Though anti-defection laws admittedly promise political stability, too much stability may be a travesty. One of the possible unintended consequences of anti-hopping law is producing rubber stamp legislatures.

Rajiv Gandhi sought for the Fifty-Second Amendment of the Indian Constitution in 2013, to bar MPs from crossing floors on the basis that party discipline and coherence will entail.[57] On the outset, this ensures smooth policymaking.

Yet, if one were to investigate deeper, coherence only exists as party leaders use the aforementioned law to control the MPs under their wing, especially if the government holds a majority. Using the anti-hopping law, The PM or the Chief Minister would be able to threaten the removal of any lawmakers from the party (and the Parliament) who do not support their motions during the legislative process.[58]

In turn, backbenchers would not be able to check the dominance by the Executive. Without the availability of such checks in a majority government, this may dampen the parliamentary process.[59]

4.3. Incapable of solving the conundrum of coalitional realignment

A vote in Malaysia entails three recipients of a mandate: candidate, party and coalition. Anti-hopping laws may solve the conundrum of individual MPs switching sides. However, a question arises if we were to perceive this issue from a wider point of view: what would happen if parties changed coalitions, but lawmakers remain in the same party as what happened during the fall of the PH government in 2020?

Wong discussed the possibility of an anti-hopping law preventing the political crisis that befell upon us in that year. Bersatu made the move to jump ship and change coalitions from the ruling PH coalition — but the Bersatu MPs still remained loyal to their parties. Technically, an anti-hopping law which focuses on individual MPs would permit this, and thus, the collapse of the PH government would still entail. To make this worse, voters who voted for the coalition, instead of the party — Bersatu in this case — would obtain an unintended outcome as the ‘defectors’ would be safe instead.[60]

On the flip side, if anti-hopping laws also punish MPs for leaving coalitions, there is a lot of room for concern as well. It may either cause many seats to be vacated if a party is expelled by other parties in a coalition, or even cause confusion if pre-election coalitions were to break up post-election.[61] In short, if an anti-hopping law is created to remedy a circumstance such as the PH collapse, then it may not be as effective as one thinks.

5.0. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, an anti-hopping law, albeit not the first time talked about, is more relevant than ever. With the infamous Sheraton Move, and economic vulnerability from hopping as well as Covid-19, contemporary times call for a stable government — an accountable one that can lead us through these tough times to happier endings.

Its effectiveness leaves but a few in doubt, evident by the multitude of commonwealth countries already having their own anti-defection law. Our judicial benches, filled with the crème de la crème of the legal discipline, are here to prevent any unfairness occurring or abuse of said law, as seen in the comprehensive judgments made mentioned above.

Nonetheless, naivete should not blind us into thinking this legal measure is perfection wrapped in sunshine and rainbows. Notwithstanding the good that it brings, further visualised in our brother and sister nations, the law also brings with it additional, and possibly arbitrary, power to political parties. Representatives lose the privilege of leaving their party, once and if, for example, they opine the principles and beliefs of the party are not parallel to theirs.

Our lawmakers are also confronted with the legal conundrum of how to bring in this law. With legal experts propounding different arguments and reasons concerning the legality of said law. Constitutional amending to Art 10 prior to legislating an anti-defection law, legislating one with the defence of ‘public order and morality’ under Art 10(2)(c), and including the law in the Federal Constitution itself are all options.

With these issues in mind, the legislators are left with a tough task. After all, it’s one personal for themselves, touching on their freedom to associate, or more accurately – their freedom to disassociate – thus would naturally be a difficult job. This should not, however, distract them from reaching a conclusion that is fundamentally for the people. As, after all, they are the peoples’ representation. To quote former United States President Abraham Lincoln ‘Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves’.[62]

References

[1] Janda, K. (2009). Laws Against Party Switching, Defecting, or Floor-Crossing in National Parliaments. Northwestern University, 1. Retrieved from <http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/uploads/wp0209.pdf>. Site accessed on 15 Dec 2021.

[2] Anbalagan, V. (2015, Aug 21). Anti-hopping law violates constitutional freedom of association, say legal eagles. The Malaysian Insider. Retrieved from <https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/anti-hopping-law-violates-constitutional-freedom-association-say-legal-eagles>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[3] Daniel Dzulkifly. (2020 Aug 3). Malaysian Bar says time for ‘anti-hopping’ law to prevent lawmakers from jumping parties. Malay Mail. Retrieved from <https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2020/08/03/malaysian-bar-says-time-for-anti-hopping-law-to-prevent-lawmakers-from-jump/1890662>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[4] Goh, P. P. (2021, Sep 11). Anti-hopping law crucial for political stability in the country. New Straits Times. Retrieved from <https://www.nst.com.my/news/politics/2021/09/726305/anti-hopping-law-crucial-political-stability-country>. Site accessed on 13 December 2021.

[5] Bowie, N. (2021, Feb 24). The duo who stole Malaysia’s democracy. Asia Times. Retrieved from <https://asiatimes.com/2021/02/the-duo-who-stole-malaysias-democracy/>. Site accessed on 13 Dec 2021.

[6] Mohd Farhan Darwis, SM Amin, & Zaim Ibrahim. (2020, Feb 26). Selepas Langkah Sheraton, kerajaan di 4 negeri rapuh. The Malaysian Insight. <https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/bahasa/s/222366>. Site accessed on 15 Dec 2021.

[7] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 43(2)(a).

[8] The Vibez. (2021, Nov 21). Fielding 2 ‘frogs’ backfired on Pakatan: analyst. The Vibez. Retrieved from <https://www.thevibes.com/articles/news/47767/fielding-2-frogs-backfires-on-pakatan-analyst>. Site accessed on 18 Dec 2021.

[9] Chacko, D. P. (2020). Party-Hopping of Lawmakers In Malaysia: A Menu Of Remedies. Jeffrey Cheah Institute on Southeast Asia. Retrieved from https://jci.edu.my/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/JCI-JSC-PB-2020-02-Party-Hopping-of-Lawmakers-of-Malaysia-RELEASE.pdf. Site accessed on 19 Dec 2021.

[10] Cent-GPS. (2021, Jun 11). Party-hopping - solution may be recall elections, party list system. Malaysiakini. <https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/578463>. Site accessed on 15 Dec 2021.

[11] Rizalman Hammim. (2021, March 14). 'Party hopping can create negative impression among foreign investors'. New Straits Times. Retrieved from <https://api.nst.com.my/news/politics/2021/03/673749/party-hopping-can-create-negative-impression-among-foreign-investors>. Site accessed on 15 Dec 2021.

[12] Federal Constitution, Art 10(2)(c).

[13] [2010] 2 MLJ 333, 343.

[14] The Federal Court provided this theoretically, as their decision was not under the restriction provided under Clause (2) of Art 10 but under the premise that the Malaysian Bar is a statutory body and cannot be deemed an association.

[15] [1992] 1 MLJ 697.

[16]Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v Nordin Bin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 697.

[17] Leonard Yeoh and Nurul Qarirah. (2020 July). The Constitutionality of Freedom of Association in Malaysia. Lexology. Retrieved from<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=60fcfabe-e30d-4947-86a8-83b23222ecdd>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[18] Ganesan, G. K . (2018 Dec 24). Should party-hopping be outlawed? Malaysiakini. Retrieved from<https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/457582>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[19] See footnote 3 above.

[20] See footnote 2 above.

[21] Vengadesan, M. (2021, Sept 11). Why recall elections could work better than anti-hopping law in Malaysia. Malaysiakini. Retrieved from <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/590874>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[22] See footnote 3 above.

[23] Mohamed Reza bin Abdul Rahim. (2020, Jun 12). ‘Freedom of Association: From Nordin Salleh to Khalib Mehtab’. Malay Mail. Retrieved from <https://www.malaymail.com/news/what-you-think/2020/06/12/freedom-of-association-from-nordin-salleh-to-khaliq-mehtab-mohamed-reza-bin/1874839>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[24] See footnote 16 above.

[25] [2010] CLJ 300.

[26] See footnote 16 above.

[27] See footnote 16 above.

[28]Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess 183rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948). Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/217(III)>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[29] See footnote 28 above.

[30] United Nations. (2021, Dec 12). Malaysia. United Nations. Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states/malaysia>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[31] See footnote 12 above.

[32] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. (2018). Response by the Government of Malaysia to the Questionnaire on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders. Retrieved from <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/GA73/states/Malaysia.pdf>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[33] See footnote 12 above.

[34] See footnote 28 above.

[35] Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). (1997 Aug 8). The Founding of ASEAN. Association of Southeast Asia Nations. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/about-asean/the-founding-of-asean/>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

[36] Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). (2012 Nov 19). ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Association of Southeast Asia Nations. Retrieved from <https://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration/>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

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[38] Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore) art 14.

[39] Federal Constitution (Malaysia) art 10.

[40] Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore) art 46(2)(b).

[41] Malhotra, G.C. (2005). Anti-Defection Law in India and the Commonwealth. New Delhi, India: Metropolitan Book Co., 60. Retrieved from <https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/58674/1/Anti_Defection_Law.pdf >. Site accessed on 14 Dec 2021.

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[44] Channel News Asia. (2012, Feb 28). Speaker of Parliament formally announces vacancy of Hougang seat. Channel News Asia. Retrieved from <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/singapore/speaker-parliament-formally-announces-vacancy-hougang-seat-1888931>. Site accessed on 14 Dec 2021.

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[46] Constitution of India, Tenth Schedule, Item 2(a)-(b).

[47] Constitution of India, Tenth Schedule, Item 6.

[48] (2020) 1 MLJ (Madras Law Journal) 335.

[49] Electoral Act 1993 (No. 105) (New Zealand) s 5.

[50] See footnote 37 above.

[51] [2004] 3 NLZR 359.

[52] See footnote 51 above.

[53] See footnote 51 above.

[54] Payne, E.J. (1874). Select Works of Edmund Burke. Indianapolis, USA: Liberty Fund, 10. Retrieved from <http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Philosophers/Burke/SpeechToTheElectorsofBristol.pdf>. Site accessed on 12 Dec 2021.

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[58] Wong, C.H. (2021, Jan 4). How to Deter Party Hopping In Malaysia? An Exploration of Remedies. The Coalition for Free and Fair Elections, 37. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348678792_HOW_TO_DETER_PARTY_HOPPING_IN_MALAYSIA_An_Exploration_of_Remedies>.

[59] See footnote 59 above, 36.

[60] See footnote 59 above, 36.

[61] See footnote 59 above, 36.

[62] Dorfman, J. (2014, July 4). 20 Quotes On Liberty And Freedom In Honor Of Independence Day. Forbes. Retrieved from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2014/07/04/20-quotes-on-liberty-and-freedom-in-honor-of-independence-day/?sh=6a49760f45b7>. Site accessed on 19 December 2021.