Episode 35: Power, Privilege, and Patronage: Unpacking Special Appointments in Malaysia

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In 2024, the appointment of a prominent politician to the board of a government-linked company (‘GLC’) reignited public debate over the special appointments in Malaysia and the processes through which it is acquired.[1] Special appointments ranging from political secretaries and special officers to high-ranking GLC executives have long been a fixture of the Malaysian political and administrative landscape.[2] However, their roles are not limited to their formal duties, but often include deeper political goals, such as gaining influence, rewarding allies, or strengthening political ties. Political secretaries, appointed by ministers or the Prime Minister, serve as close advisors and liaisons, yet they are sometimes involved in matters beyond their job scope.[3] Similarly, special officers, who are often selected from among party loyalists, are tasked with assisting ministers but frequently act as instruments of political agenda-setting.[4] At the highest levels, GLC CEOs oversee corporations that manage substantial national assets, making their appointments particularly consequential.[5]

These appointments have raised recurring concerns about transparency, political patronage, and the decline of meritocracy. This article examines the concept and practice of special appointments within Malaysia’s constitutional and legal framework. Furthermore, the article also explores the broader implications of these appointments, particularly issues of accountability, transparency, and governance integrity. By unpacking the intersection of power, privilege, and patronage, this article will delve into the impact of such appointments on Malaysia’s political and institutional landscape.

2.0 CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

To understand the legitimacy and boundaries of special appointments in Malaysia — such as political secretaries, special officers, and CEOs of government-linked companies (‘GLCs’) — it is essential to first explore the constitutional and legal provisions that govern them. These appointments occupy a unique space between political necessity and administrative responsibility, often raising questions about legality, accountability, and institutional oversight. While some are grounded in formal legislation, others operate in a legal grey area or are said to be driven by political convention.

A study from The institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) Malaysia has tracked appointments across 135 Federal Statutory Bodies (‘FSBs’) and 283 GLC subsidiaries spanning five prime ministers, from Dato' Sri Najib Razak (PM-6) to Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim (PM-10). The research highlights the pervasiveness of political appointments, particularly under Najib’s administration, which recorded the highest number at 301. Even during shorter administrations like those of Ismail Sabri (273 appointments in 15 months) and Muhyiddin Yassin (186 in 17 months), the number of appointees remained significant.[6] As of October 2023, the current administration under Anwar Ibrahim has made at least 95 known political appointments — approaching the 117 confirmed by the Prime Minister himself in a parliamentary response.[7]

2.1 Constitutional Provisions on Appointments

The Federal Constitution provides the foundational framework for appointments within the public sector. Article 132 lists the public services in Malaysia,[8] while Article 144 empowers Services Commissions to oversee appointments, promotions, and disciplinary control for public officers.[9] However, many special appointments — such as political secretaries and special officers — exist outside the purview of the Public Services Commission (‘PSC’), often appointed directly by the Prime Minister, Ministers, or Chief Ministers.

Moreover, Article 40[10] outlines the role of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, who must act on the advice of the Prime Minister or the Cabinet in most matters, including certain key appointments. Yet, in practice, many non-constitutional appointments (like GLC Chairpersons) bypass the formal constitutional machinery, creating a dual system: one rooted in public service law, and another operating on political discretion. This legal ambiguity has far-reaching implications on governance, particularly in terms of transparency and meritocracy.

2.2 Legal Basis for Political Secretaries, Special Officers, GLC CEOs and Statutory Bodies

2.2.1 Political Secretaries and Special Officers

Political secretaries are a legacy of the Westminster model, meant to assist ministers with political liaison, constituency affairs, and coordination between ministries and party organisations. The position of a political secretary is one of the few special appointments in Malaysia that is clearly codified in the Federal Constitution. Article 43C serves as the legal basis for their appointment, empowering the Prime Minister to appoint any number of persons as he may think fit to be political secretaries.[11] Under Article 43C(4), the duties and functions of these political secretaries are to be determined by the Cabinet, reflecting a level of executive discretion in shaping their roles.[12] These individuals serve as close aides and political liaisons, assisting in the coordination of political activities, managing communications, and maintaining engagement with party stakeholders and constituents.

On the other hand, the appointment of Special Officers lacks a specific legal basis in the Federal Constitution or statutory law. These positions are typically filled at the discretion of ministers or high-ranking officials, without formal procedures or standardized criteria. As such, Special Officers are not part of the public service as defined under Article 132 of the Federal Constitution. Their roles and responsibilities are often determined by the appointing authority, leading to variations in function and influence. The absence of a clear legal framework for these appointments raises concerns about transparency, accountability, and the potential for patronage in the Malaysian governance system.

2.2.2 GLC CEOs and Statutory Body Appointees

The appointment of CEOs to GLCs is another highly contentious area where political power intersects with corporate governance. While GLCs operate under the Companies Act 2016, and their boards and CEOs should theoretically be subject to corporate governance principles, the reality in Malaysia is more complex. Many GLCs are owned or controlled by the government through entities such as Khazanah Nasional, Permodalan Nasional Berhad (‘PNB’), or the Minister of Finance Incorporated (‘MoF Inc.’). These entities are often used as vehicles to exercise ministerial control over appointments, sometimes bypassing open, competitive selection procedures.[13]

Statutory bodies such as MARA, FELDA, and Tabung Haji are governed by their own Acts of Parliament, which typically grant Ministers wide discretion in the appointment of board members and executive officers. For instance, the MARA Act 1966[14] empowers the Minister of Rural and Regional Development to appoint its Chairman and Council Members, without specific criteria or parliamentary vetting.

3.0 POLITICAL PATRONAGE, TRANSPARENCY DEFICITS AND THE REVOLVING DOOR BETWEEN POLITICS AND BUSINESS

Malaysian governance has long been marked by a distinctive blend of power and privilege, where special appointments are frequently awarded not solely on merit but on political allegiance and business connections. 

3.1 Political Patronage and Cronyism

A central problem in Malaysia is the pervasive nature of political patronage. Appointments to high positions — especially in government-linked companies (‘GLCs’) and statutory agencies — are often allocated by virtue of personal relationships, institutional loyalty, and kinship ties rather than objective criteria. Dr. Terence Gomez traces how figures within UMNO and its affiliated networks have used their positions to channel lucrative public contracts into privately owned enterprises.[15] For instance, there are cases such as the Port Klang Free Zone controversy where politicians, like Dato Sri Tiong King Sing, served dual roles as legislator and corporate executives.[16] Similarly, the Big Money: Time to shut the revolving door between business and politics article (no page number provided) decries the practice of appointing politicians to senior corporate roles as undermining the critical check-and-balance mechanism.[17] 

3.2 The Revolving Door Between Politics and Business

Perhaps the most emblematic symptom of the challenges is the revolving door phenomenon, whereby individuals move seamlessly between public office and lucrative positions in business. This interchange not only creates conflicts of interest but also reinforces a system of political-business collusion. 

As mentioned above, prominent figures such as former transport minister, Tun Ling Liong Sik and MP Datuk Sri Tiong King Sing have been implicated in scandals that expose the ease with which public contracts and government contracts are siphoned to benefit politically connected business entities.[18] Such appointments should be banned, noting that an effective separation of powers is essential for reducing corruption and restoring public trust. 

This report details interlocking directorships and familial networks that channel government resources into private hands. When politicians — or their relatives — are allowed to occupy executive roles in companies that benefit from government contracts, a conflict of interest arises that ultimately harms the nation’s economy.[19] 

Moreover, an article from the Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies offers a broader view of how successive prime ministers’ leadership styles have influenced the governance system. The transactional style adopted by later leaders correlates with increased instances of cronyism and a less transparent decision-making process.[20] These leadership approaches, in combination with a historically entrenched revolving-door practice, have contributed to an environment where public office becomes a stepping stone for personal enrichment rather than a platform for national development. 

4.0 CONCLUSION

The issue of special appointments in Malaysia exposes deep-rooted concerns for accountability. While some roles, like political secretaries, have a constitutional or statutory basis,[21] many others operate in a legal grey area, leading to widespread patronage, cronyism, and a weakening of meritocracy in both the public and corporate sectors.

Data from multiple administrations reveal a trend of excessive political appointments, with the practice continuing across successive prime ministers.[22] The discretion in appointing individuals to powerful positions in GLCs and statutory bodies has created a dual system, one grounded in public service law, and another dominated by political discretion. The lack of standardised criteria and legal oversight allows for misuse of power, undermining institutional integrity.

To address these issues, Malaysia must commit to comprehensive institutional reforms. This includes strengthening the role of independent appointment commissions, codifying transparent criteria for special positions,[23] enforcing cooling-off periods between public office and corporate appointments, and enhancing parliamentary oversight.[24] Without such reforms, the governance system risks remaining vulnerable to political manipulation and economic inefficiency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[1] Malaysia Kini. (2024, Jan 9). Sangetha facing brickbats over Port Klang Authority appointment. Malaysia Kini. Retrieved from <https://m.malaysiakini.com/news/692549>. Site accessed on 9 Apr 2025.

[2] Lee, B. (2024, Oct 3). Time for M'sia to move away from political appointments to GLCs, statutory bodies, says think tank. The Star. Retrieved from <https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/10/03/time-for-m039sia-to-move-away-from-political-appointments-to-glcs-statutory-bodies-says-think-tank>. Site accessed on 9 Apr 2025.

[3] Bernama. (2019, Jul 18). Dr M: Duties and responsibilities of political secretary must be clear. Malaysia Kini. Retrieved from <https://www.malaysiakini.com/news/484416>. Site accessed on 10 Apr 2025.

[4] Aliran. (2024, Oct 26). Government-linked firms: Why does the ‘Madani’ government still defend political appointments?. Aliran. Retrieved from <https://m.aliran.com/civil-society-voices/government-linked-firms-why-does-the-madani-government-still-defend-political-appointments>. Site accessed on 10 Apr 2025.

[5] See Footnote 2.

[6] Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), “IDEAS identifies 95 political appointments in the current administration, fewer compared to previous administrations”, IDEAS Malaysia (Dec. 14, 2023). Retrieved from <https://www.ideas.org.my/ideas-identifies-95-political-appointments-in-the-current-administration-fewer-compared-to-previous-administrations/>. Site accessed on 12 Apr 2025.

[7] The Sun Daily, “117 political appointments by government in MoF Inc companies, statutory bodies - PM”, The Sun Malaysia (July 19, 2024). Retrieved from <https://thesun.my/malaysia-news/117-political-appointments-by-government-in-mof-inc-companies-statutory-bodies-pm-MA12746318>. Site accessed on 12 Apr 2025.

[8] Article 132, Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

[9] Article 144, Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

[10] Article 40, Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

[11] Article 43C, Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

[12] Article 43C(4), Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

[13] Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS), “Know Your GLCs”, IDEAS Malaysia (n.d.). Retrieved from<https://www.ideas.org.my/know-your-glcs/>. Site accessed on 12 Apr 2025.

[14] MARA Act 1966.

[15] Dr. Edmund Terence Gomez (2022, Nov). Business in Politics: Seeking Control of Malaysia’s Political System. The Center To Combat Corruption AND Cronyism (C4 Center). pp 1-2. Site accessed <https://www.malaysia-today.net/files/Business-in-Politics-by-Dr-Terence-Gomez-20221102-12-07pm.pdf>. Last accessed on 7 Apr 2025.

[16] Dr. Edmund Terence Gomez (2022, Nov). Business in Politics: Seeking Control of Malaysia’s Political System. The Center To Combat Corruption AND Cronyism (C4 Center). pp 13-14. Site accessed <https://www.malaysia-today.net/files/Business-in-Politics-by-Dr-Terence-Gomez-20221102-12-07pm.pdf>. Last accessed on 7 Apr 2025.

[17] The Editor/ The Edge (2011, Feb 13). Big Money: Time to shut the revolving door between business and politics. The Edge Malaysia. Site accessed <https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/big-money-time-shut-revolving-door-between-business-and-politics>. Last accessed on 7 Apr 2025. 

[18] Dr. Edmund Terence Gomez (2022, Nov). Business in Politics: Seeking Control of Malaysia’s Political System. The Center To Combat Corruption AND Cronyism (C4 Center). pp 13-14. Site accessed <https://www.malaysia-today.net/files/Business-in-Politics-by-Dr-Terence-Gomez-20221102-12-07pm.pdf>. Last accessed on 7 Apr 2025.

[19] Dr. Edmund Terence Gomez (2022, Nov). Business in Politics: Seeking Control of Malaysia’s Political System. The Center To Combat Corruption AND Cronyism (C4 Center). pp 23. Site accessed <https://www.malaysia-today.net/files/Business-in-Politics-by-Dr-Terence-Gomez-20221102-12-07pm.pdf>. Last accessed on 7 Apr 2025.

[20] Shyamala Nagaraja; Kiong-hock Lee. (2024). Political Leadership Matters: Malaysia’s Unrealised Potential. Malaysian Journal of Economic Studies Vol. 61 No. 2, pp. 310-320.  

[21] Article 43C, Federal Constitution of Malaysia.

[22] IDEAS. (2024, 3 Oct). IDEAS Identifies 95 Political Appointments in the Current Administration, Fewer Compared to Previous Administrations. IDEAS. Retrieved from <https://www.ideas.org.my/ideas-identifies-95-political-appointments-in-the-current-administration-fewer-compared-to-previous-administrations/>. Site accessed on 13 Apr 2025.

[23] George, M. (2023, 3 Jul). Political appointments don’t make for good governance. The Malaysian Insight. Retrieved from <https://www.themalaysianinsight.com/s/450522>. Site accessed on 13 Apr 2025.

[24] Choy Nyen Yiau. (2024, 3 Oct). Political appointments still the norm under unity govt, albeit reduced — IDEAS. The Edge Malaysia. Retrieved from <https://theedgemalaysia.com/node/728917>. Site accessed on 13 Apr 2025.